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The claim that "inflation is the cruelest tax of all" is often interpreted as
meaning that inflation  hurts the poor relatively more than the rich. It could also mean
that the inflation tax is particularly unfair because, the taxing mechanism being little
understood, the inflation tax can be imposed by stealth.
The essential a priori  argument is that the rich are better able to protect
themselves against, or benefit from, the effects of inflation  than are the poor. In
particular, the rich and more sophisticated  are likely to have better access to financial
instruments that hedge in some way against inflation, while the (small) portfolios of
the poor are likely to have a larger share of cash. The poor may also depend more
than the rich on state-determined  income that is not fully indexed to inflation. Among
the elderly poor, pensions are often not fully indexed and so inflation will directly
reduce their real incomes. For the remainder  of the poor, state subsidies or direct
transfers may also not be fully indexed.
However, these arguments are not decisive. Aside from the points that the
poor are likely to hold relatively more cash in their portfolios, and to be less
sophisticated,  the relative effects of inflation on the rich versus  the poor must be
specific to the institutions and histories of each economy. Certainly, study of the long
list of the potential effects of inflation  on the economy outlined in Fischer and
Modigliani (1978) does not lead to a clear presumption that it is the poor who are hurt
relatively more by inflation, especially  because so many of the effects of inflation
come through complicated details of the tax system, including capital taxation. The
question must be an empirical one, and the answer may well differ among economies.3
In this paper, we examine  inflation's effects on the poor in two ways. First, we
draw on the results of a global survey of 31869 individuals in 3  8 countries, which asked
whether individuals think inflation is an important  national problem. This provides an
indirect way at getting at the issue of whether inflation is more of a problem for the poor
than for the rich.  Second, we assess the effects of inflation on direct measures of
inequality and poverty in various cross-country  and cross-time samples.
Our evidence supports the views that inflation is regarded as more of a problem
by the poor than it is by the non-poor, and that inflation appears to reduce the relative
income of the poor. It thus adds to a growing body of literature that on balance  - but
not unanimously  - tends to support the view that inflation is a cruel tax.  We start by
reviewing the literature, and then turn to the new evidence.
1. Literature Survey
Most of the literature deals with the U.S., using annual data on poverty rates and
inflation. Powers (1995) finds that inflation worsens a consumption-based  poverty
measure over 1959-92,  but has no significant  impact on the income-based  poverty rate.
Cutler and Katz (1991), in contrast, find that an increase in inflation reduces  the poverty
rate over 1959-89. Blank and Blinder (1986) found that inflation increased poverty rates,
but also slightly increased the income shares of the bottom two quintiles (only the second
quintile was significant). On balance, Blank and Blinder argue that "there is little or no
evidence that inflation is the cruelest tax."
Moving to other countries, Cardoso (1992) argues that the inflation  tax does not
affect those already below the poverty line in Latin America because of their negligible
cash holdings. However, she finds that higher inflation is associated with lower real4
wages in a panel of seven Latin American countries. An additional fragment of evidence
comes from Rezende (1998, p. 568), who points out that the Gini coefficient in Brazil
increased steadily with rising inflation in the 1  980s and then declined with the successful
inflation stabilization  of 1994-1996. Datt and Ravallion (1996) found in a cross-time,
cross-state study of India that observations  with higher inflation  rates also had higher
poverty rates.
Romer and Romer (1998) argue that the effects of inflation on the incomes of the
poor are likely to differ between cyclical and longer-term  perspectives. In the short run,
an increase in (unanticipated)  inflation  will be associated with a decline in
unemployment, that may well relatively benefit the poor. Over the longer term, however,
higher inflation cannot permanently  reduce unemployment, and the effects of inflation on
the poor could then be reversed. Even in a cyclical perspective, Romer and Romer find
the effects of unemployment  on the income distribution to be stronger in earlier decades
than in the nineties. Using an international  panel, they find that lower inflation tends to
increase the income of the poor over the longer term - a result they attribute in part to
the negative association between inflation and economic growth. Agenor (1998) also
finds poverty rates to be positively related to inflation in cross-country data.
In our work using polling data, we will explore the impact on attitudes to inflation
of factors other than relative income. The poor are less educated,  and there may be an
independent effect of inflation's impact on the uneducated. Our priors on the impact of
education on attitudes to inflation are, like those on income, ambiguous. One
consideration  is that human capital may be a good hedge against inflation, so those with
more human capital feel more protected (also stocks and bonds may be good hedges5
against inflation and they are also held disproportionately  by the more educated). The
uneducated  probably have a lower weight of human capital relative to cash in their
portfolios, and so dislike inflation more. But the more educated may know more about
the damage that inflation  can do to the economy as a whole and so may be more likely to
mention inflation as a top concern than the less educated.
Previous literature using polling data includes Fischer and Huizinga (1982), who
analyzed  the relative probabilities of mentioning inflation  and unemployment as a (or the
most) serious problem facing the nation, in the US over the period 1939-78.  They found
that inflation was consistently more frequently cited as a serious problem than
unemployment except during recessions. Apropos the question in this paper, they found
a positive association between income and the probability of mentioning inflation as a
serious problem ("inflation aversion"),  although the relationship was sometimes non-
monotonic. Moreover, in regression analysis income was positively but insignificantly
related to inflation aversion. Rose (1997) found no association between the standard of
living and inflation aversion relative to unemployment  aversion in a sample of polling
data from ex-Communist countries.
Fischer and Huizinga (1982) also found little relationship  between the level of
education and inflation aversion.  However, their education  variable discriminated only
between high school education and above.
We will control for the national averages of inflation aversion  when testing the
poor's relative inflation aversion. On the cross-section  relationship  between inflation
aversion and actual inflation, Fischer (1996) found a surprisingly weak correlation  using
the same survey data that we use in this paper. Likewise Rose (1997) found little6
association among transition countries between actual inflation and inflation aversion-
inflation aversion rose relative to unemployment  as inflation was falling. The Czech
Republic with its low inflation had higher inflation aversion than Ukraine and Belarus
with their quadruple-digit  inflation (although  causality is important  - the Czechs'
inflation aversion could be the reason they have low inflation). However, Fischer and
Huizinga (1982) did find that the cross-time  variation in the US of mentioning inflation
or unemployment as the most serious problem was associated with actual inflation and
unemployment.
Shiller (1996) poses a question closely related to ours, "Why Do People Dislike
Inflation?" He conducted a questionnaire  survey of 677 people in the US, Germany,  and
Brazil. His answer was that people perceived inflation as reducing their standard of
living. In the US sample, when asked what was their biggest concern about inflation, 77
percent of the sample chose the response "inflation hurts my real buying power." Only 7
percent chose the traditional view of economists  - "inflation causes a lot of
inconveniences: I find it harder to comparison  shop, I feel I have to avoid holding too
much cash etc." When pressed further,  the majority in the samples in the US, Germany,
and Brazil supported the view that their wages would not rise as fast as the price level
during the process of inflation. If Shiller's results indeed reflect most people's view of
inflation, than we might expect the poor and uneducated  to dislike inflation more because
they are probably less protected  by asset income from changes in their real wages. We
will find some support for the idea that inflation  reduces the real wages of the poor in our
empirical results.7
II.  Results on inflation concerns and income
H.A The data
Roper Starch Worldwide, a marketing,  public opinion, and advertising research
firm, coordinated  the survey that we use to measure inflation concerns.  International
Research Associates (INRA) did the actual field work with its affiliates and partner
companies. The survey was undertaken  by Roper Starch during February to May 1995.
Table 1 lists the 38 countries  - 19 industrialized, and 19 developing and transition -
covered in the survey.
Respondents to the survey from all countries were classified according to their
standard of living (self-assessed)  and level of education. The survey question on which
we focus is:
"Here is a list of things people have told us they are concerned about today.
Would you read over the list and then tell me which 2 or 3 you personally are
most concerned about today."
The economic concerns included in the list were "recession and unemployment,
inflation and high prices, money enough to live right and pay bills, educational quality"
There were 14 other non-economic  concerns,  and respondents could also say "other, none
of these, don't know".  We define a dummy  variable that takes the value 1 if people
mention "inflation and high prices" among the top 2 or 3 concerns (the top 2 or 3 are not
ranked among themselves), and 0 otherwise.
The wording of the inflation response is unfortunate in that it also includes "high
prices."'  It is unclear how the respondent  will interpret "high prices"-  will it be high prices
compared to the past or high prices compared to the respondent's wage? If the latter, then the
respondent may simply be complaining  about low real wages. Fortunately, there is another8
Table 1: Percentage  of responses  that mentioned  given  problem  as among  the top 2 or 3 problems,  by country
Money  Environ- Reli-  For-
Inflation  enough Govn't  Edu-  Racial/  mental  gious  eagn  For-  Other/
& High  Recession/  Drug  to live  Cor-  cation  Immi-  Ethnic  Pol-  Extre- Re-  eign  Terror- Don't
Trices  Crime AIDS Unemplmnt Abuse on  ruption quality gration  Relations lution  mism  lations Aid  ism  Know
Australia  4  17  6  13  6  8  8  9  6  4  12  2  1  3  1  1
Austria  7  16  10  9  8  6  6  2  6  4  11  3  1  2  7  2
Belgium  10  13  9  18  10  5  12  2  6  2  5  2  1  1  2  1
Brazil  7  17  14  10  9  8  14  10  0  1  4  1  1  2  2  0
Canada  10  18  8  17  6  10  6  7  4  3  7  1  1  1  1  1
Chile  5  10  17  8  19  9  7  13  0  0  7  1  1  1  2  0
China  25  13  1  10  1  11  15  12  1  0  8  0  1  1  1  I
Colombia  9  15  14  13  10  4  10  9  1  0  9  1  1  0  7  0
Czech Republic  14  26  7  4  7  8  11  3  1  2  12  2  0  0  2  0
Denmark  3  12  7  10  3  9  3  8  8  6  15  2  5  5  3  1
Finland  4  21  3  24  5  16  9  1  2  1  8  3  0  0  1  3
France  4  12  19  21  6  6  6  4  4  3  4  5  1  2  2  0
Germany  8  21  6  16  7  6  6  3  4  4  12  2  0  1  3  0
Greece  9  13  14  20  15  2  6  6  0  0  8  1  1  1  3  0
HongKong  I1  12  7  14  6  8  3  5  3  1  7  2  3  4  3  9
Hungary  19  17  2  10  2  17  9  7  2  1  8  1  2  1  1  0
India  13  14  7  14  7  7  9  9  2  3  6  3  1  1  5  0
Indonesia  12  24  9  24  11  2  5  6  0  1  4  1  1  1  0  0
Ireland  4  18  10  15  17  10  6  3  3  1  5  1  0  3  3  0
Italy  6  10  12  22  2  7  13  3  3  4  1  1  3  1  1  1  0
Japan  6  9  6  20  2  4  21  6  0  1  17  1  4  1  0  3
Mexico  17  13  7  18  7  7  15  5  1  1  4  1  1  1  2  0
Netherlands  3  23  6  12  7  7  5  5  4  7  7  8  0  1  3  2
Norway  2  19  2  12  11  10  4  9  4  4  It  3  2  3  1  1
Philippines  12  24  4  12  10  4  10  6  0  0  9  1  1  0  6  0
Poland  11  22  6  12  7  I  I1  2  0  1  t0  4  1  1  3  0
Russia  22  28  1  13  1  15  8  2  1  3  5  0  0  0  1  1
Singapore  23  12  4  9  4  12  2  14  1  3  10  1  2  1  0  2
Spain  7  6  12  18  13  9  10  4  1  2  6  1  0  3  9  0
Sweden  5  20  5  15  11  3  4  3  6  6  13  3  1  1  2  1
Switzerland  6  15  11  15  10  5  5  3  4  6  10  5  2  1  3  0
Taiwan  11  13  4  8  11  4  18  12  1  1  13  0  1  0  1  2
Ihailand  5  23  20  12  10  1  8  7  1  0  10  t  0  0  1  0
Turkey  19  8  5  12  4  5  11  7  1  3  8  6  1  1  10  0
Ukraine  22  26  2  9  3  19  10  2  0  2  4  0  0  0  0  0
United Kingdom  5  19  4  14  9  it  6  10  3  2  7  2  1  2  3  0
USA  7  24  12  6  11  10  6  7  3  4  4  2  1  1  1  0
Venezuela  16  16  10  11  11  5  13  12  1  0  2  0  1  1  2  0
Sample  average  10  17  8  14  8  8  9  6  2  2  8  2  1  1  3  19
"top concern" that directly addresses the standard of living, which is "money enough to live
right and pay bills."  The correlation among all respondents between these two "top
concerns" was only .0043, with a p-value of .437. Hence,  we can be moderately reassured
that the "inflation and high prices" question  is really about inflation  and not about real wages.
Fischer and Huizinga (1982) found no difference  in poll responses in the US to questions that
mentioned just "inflation" and those that mentioned "inflation and high prices".
The income question on the survey asked the respondents to classify themselves
in one of seven categories: "rich, very comfortable,  comfortable, average,  just getting by,
poor, and very poor." Thus participants are self-classifying  on this question, and we
should therefore interpret the answers as relating to the relative income of the participant
in his or her own country. We define dummy variables for each category that take the
value 1 if the respondents self-classify  in that category and zero otherwise. Similarly  the
education question asked the respondents to put themselves in one of the following  three
categories: "primary or less, secondary/technical,  higher". We again code three dummy
variables for each category. We will also include country dummies in our regressions,
and will later review them as indicators of the underlying sensitivity to inflation in each
country.
Table 1.  shows summary  statistics on the poll responses in each country. The
percentages for each problem x are the number of total responses that mentioned x as
among the top 2 or 3 national problems, where each respondent  has 2 to 3 responses. The
average across nations is for 10 percent of the responses to be "inflation". Only crime and
recession/unemployment  account for more responses on average.10
II.B Income and education results
We do a probit equation, with the dependent variable equal to one if inflation is
mentioned as among the top two or three national concerns. The independent  variables
are the income category dummies and the education category dummies. The results are
shown in Table 2. The category "rich" is omitted from the specification, so the
coefficients on the income variables measure  the difference  between the coefficient on
that income category and "rich."  Likewise,  the category "higher education" is omitted, so
the coefficients on the education  variables measure the difference  between that category
and "higher education."
Table 2: Estimated probit equation for mentioning  "inflation
and high prices" as a top national concern
Observations:  31869  _
Parameter Standard  t-statistic  P-value
Estimate  Error
Constant  -1.09  0.141  -7.95  [.000]
iStandard  of living of individual ("Rich" is omitted category):  l
Ver  Comfortable  0.03  0.14  0.25  [.8011
Comfortable  0.15  0.13  1.17  [.240]
Average  0.25  0.13  1.91  [.057]
Just Getting By  0.28  0.13  2.11  [.035]
Poor  0.31  0.14  2.30  [.022]
Very Poor  0.36  0.15  2.39  [.017]
Educational attainment ("Higher  education" is omitted category)
Primary  School  0.131  0.02  5.22  [.000]
Secondary School  0.06!  0.02  2.79  [.005]
Note: country intercept  dummies are included but not shown.
Table 2 shows the results. (Individual country effects are not shown at this point;
they will be discussed below.)  The likelihood  of mentioning inflation as a top concern is
decreasing in the standard of living of the respondent. The coefficient increases11
monotonically as respondents range from "very comfortable"  to "very poor."  The
coefficients on "just getting by," "poor" and "very poor" are all statistically significant,
meaning that the difference  between those categories  and "rich" is statistically significant.
The significance  is not overwhelming  given the large sample, but it does pass the
common statistical threshold. The very poor have a 10.5 percent higher probability of
mentioning inflation as a top concern than do the rich. The poor are thus relatively more
concerned than the rich about inflation.
The pattem for the education variable  is similar: the less educated dislike inflation
more than the more educated. The difference  between those who have a primary
education or less and those with higher education is highly significant statistically,
though not absolutely large. The coefficient implies that those with only a primary
education have a 3.8 percent higher probability  of mentioning  inflation as a top concern
than do those with higher education. 2 Those with a secondary  education are also
significantly more likely to mention inflation as a top concern  than those with higher
education.  Recalling the possibly offsetting effects of human capital as a hedge against
inflation and the greater knowledge  of inflation's damage with higher education, as
factors affecting  the response, our results suggest that the first effect dominates the
second.
II.  C Robustness checks
Our first robustness check is to split the sample between developing and
developed countries. Table 3a shows that the results are still very strong in the industrial
country sample, but Table 3b shows much weaker results in the developing country
sample. The magnitudes of the coefficients are uniformly lower in the developing country12
sample than in the industrial country sample. In the industrial country sample, the very
poor have a 14 percent higher probability  of mentioning inflation as a top concern than
the rich. In the developing country sample, the very poor have a 9 percent higher
probability than the rich.
Table 3a: Results for industrial  economies (16352 observations)
(country effects included but not shown)
Parameter  Standard  t-statistic  P-value
Estimate  Error
Constant  -1.25  0.23  -5.56  [.000]
Standard  of living ("Rich" is omitted category):
Very Comfortable  0.16  0.23  0.69  [.391]
Comfortable  0.26  0.22  1.15  [.1841
Average  0.33  0.22  1.51  [.022]
Just Getting By  0.31  0.22  1.40  [.039]
Poor  0.49  0.23  2.13  [.004]
Very Poor  0.59  0.26  2.29  [.004]
Educational  level ("Higher education"  is omitted  category)
Primary School  0.29  0.04  7.97  [.000]
Secondary School  0.18  0.03  5.74  [.000]13
Table  3b: Developing  Countries (15517 observations)
(country effects included but not shown)
Parameter  Standard  t-statistic  P-value
Estimate  Error
Constant  -1.20  0  .17  -7.01  [.000]
Standard  of living ("Rich" is omitted category):
Very Comfortable  -0.04  0.17  -0.23  [.822]
Comfortable  0.10  0.16  0.61  [.539]
Average  0.21  0.16  1.28  [.202]
Just Getting By  0.27  0.16  1.65  [.099]
Poor  0.25  0.17  1.50  [.134]
Very Poor  0.27  0.18  1.44  [.150]
Educational  level  ("Higher education"  is omitted category)
Primary  School  0.00  0.03  0.01  [.993]
Secondary School  -0.03  0.03  -1.20C  [.2301
The weakness of the developing country results may have to do with collinearity
in discriminating among the finely defined income categories.  When we aggregate the
bottom two categories as "lower class", the middle three categories as "middle class", and
the top two categories as "upper class", we get statistically  significant differences in the
developing country sample between "lower class" and "upper class"', and between14
"middle class" and "upper class" (Table 4). These differences  are also significant  in the
industrial sample. The coefficient on "lower class" continues to be higher in the industrial
sample than in the developing country sample.
Table 4: Results with aggregated  income classes
Parameter Standard
Estimate  Error t-statistic  P-value
Industrial countries
Constant  -1.11  0.08  -14.65  [.000]
Income Class ("Upper Class" is omitted category)
Middle  Class  0.15  0.06  2.52  [.012]
Lower Class  0.36  0.09  4.07  [.000]
Educational level ("Higher education" is omitted category)
Primary Education  0.30  0.04  8.36  [.000]
Secondary Education  0.19  0.03  5.99  [.000]
Parameter Standard
Estimate  Error  t-statistic  P-value
Developing
countries
Constant  -1.24  0.08  -16.28  [.000]
Income  Class ("Upper Class" is omitted  category)
Middle Class  0.26  0.071  3.69  [.000]
Lower  Class  0.23  0.061  3.91  [.000]
Educational level ("Higher education" is omitted category)
Primary  Education  0.03  0.03  0.83  [.406]
Secondary  Education  -0.02  0.03  -0.62  [.537]
The education variables are not robust across the two samples. They are still
highly significant  in the industrial country sample, but are always insignificant in the
developing country sample.
Our second robustness check is to also include age and occupational groups. The
seven age groups are 14-20 (the omitted category), 21-29,30-39,  40-49, 50-59, 60-69, and
70 and over. The occupational categories  are student (the omitted category),15
professional/executive,  white collar, blue collar, unemployed, homemaker,  and retired.
Table 5 shows the results.
Table 5: Robustness to Age and Occupation
Observations: 31443
Country dummies are included but not shown
Parameter Standard t-statistic  P-value
Estimate  Error
Constant  -1.34  0.14  -9.43  [.000]
Standard of living ("Rich" is omitted category):
Very Comfortable  0.04  0.14  0.31  [.755]
Comfortable  0.15  0.13  1.12  [.264]
Average  0.23  0.13  1.77  [.076]
Just Getting By  0.25  0.13  1.90  [.057]
Poor  0.28  0.14  2.04  [.041]
Very Poor  0.32  0.15  2.13  [.033]
Educational attainment ("Higher education" is omitted
category)
Primary School  I  0.101  0.031  3.69  [.000]
Secondary School  0.061  0.02  3.01  [.003]
Age Groups (14-20 age group is omitted category)
People in their 20s  0.17  0.03  4.84  [.000]
People in their 30s  0.21  0.04  5.66  [.000]
People in their 40s  0.17  0.04  4.34  [.000]
People in their 50s  0.20  0.04  4.87  [.000]
People in their 60s  0.28  0.05  6.03  [.000]
People in their 70s+  0.26  0.06  4.60  [.000]
Occupational  Groups  ("Student"  is omitted  category)
Professional/Executive  0.06  0.04  1.50  [.133]
White Collar  0.06  0.04  1.48  [.140]
Blue Collar  0.09  0.04  2.37  [.018]
Unemployed  0.05  0.05  1.04  [.300]
Homemaker  0.06  0.04  1.55  [.121]
Retired  0.06  0.05  1.15  [.250]
The results on poverty and education  are robust to the inclusion of age group
dummies and occupational group dummies. The poor and very poor are still significantly
more likely than the richer to mention inflation as a top concern. Primary-educated and16
secondary-educated  respondents  are still more likely to cite inflation as a concern than
those with higher education.
All of the age groups are more likely to be concerned about inflation than
teenagers. The age group most concerned  with inflation is people in their sixties,
followed closely by people in their seventies and above (the difference between the
sixties and seventies is not statistically  significant). This group is at the stage in the life
cycle of consuming by running down their assets, and so may dislike the uncertainty
introduced by inflation.
The occupational group most concerned with inflation is blue-collar workers. This
reinforces the finding that those who are more averse  to inflation are relatively
disadvantaged  on several different dimensions  - the poor, the uneducated,  and the
unskilled (blue collar) workers.
We also tried a gender dummy. Males were slightly more likely to mention
inflation as a problem than females, but the difference  was not statistically significant.
I.D Other concerns
We also examined what other economic concerns  the poor had, to see how their
concern with inflation compares  to other problems. Table 6 shows which concerns are
disproportionately  and significantly  more likely to be mentioned  by the poor. The result
on unemployment and recession  is very surprising - the poor are more likely to mention
it as a problem than the rich, but the difference  is not significant.
Other concerns follow a more predictable  pattern. The poor are much more likely
than the rich to mention "money enough to live right" as a concern, not surprisingly. The17
less educated are predictably much less likely to mention quality of education as a
concern than the more educated.
On a question where our priors were not so clear, we found that the poor were less
likely than the rich to mention crime as a concern. The difference  was not very
significant,  however. Confusing the picture on crime further, the primary-educated  were
more likely to mention crime than the college-educated. 3
Table  6: What  other concerns  do the poor  have?
t-statistic on income or educational level in  probit regression  for
mentioning concern shown:
Inflation  and  Recession  and  Money  Educational  Crime
high prices unemployment  enough  to  quality
l  I  ~~~~~~~~live  right,
l__ _ _ _ _ _ _  l__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  pay bills
Standard of living of individual ("Rich" is omitted category):
Very Comfortable  0.2511  -0.52  0.051  0.86|  -0.29
Comfortable  1.17  0.26  1.431  0.50  -0.55
Average  1.91  1.03  2.88  -0.41  -0.35l
Just Getting  By  2.11  1.34  4.89  -0.47  -1.43
Poor  2.30  1.51  5.27  -0.94  -2.07
Very Poor  2.39  1.04k  5.81  0.54  -1.14
Educational attainment ("Higher education" is omitted category)
Primary School  5.22T  -0.43T  6.01  -17.66<  4.42
Secondary  School  L  2.791  -0.05  4.041  -11.85|  0.97
We also tried the gender dummy in the regressions for the other economic
concerns. The only significant  results were that females were more likely than males to
mention "money enough to live right" and "education quality" as concerns.
HIE Country effects
Although not directly relevant to our main question, the pattern of country effects
is interesting  (as was previously noted in Fischer (1996)). Figure 1 graphs the countries'
propensity to mention inflation as a top national  problem (from Table 1) against the18
Figure 1: Probability of Mentioning Inflation  as a Top National
Problem and Average Inflation During Previous 10 Years
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actual inflation rate in the decade preceding the survey (1985-94).  (We would get a very
similar picture using the country dummies  from the regression in Table 2 for inflation
preferences.) Although there is a significant  positive relationship  between the log of
average inflation 1985-94  and the country propensities  to mention inflation as a top
problem, there are some striking outliers. The country in which respondents were, ceteris
paribus, most concerned about inflation is not Ukraine, Russia, or Brazil - in all of
which the inflation rate shortly before the poll had been around 1000 percent or higher  -
but is China with its modest inflation rate of 12  percent. An even more striking outlier is
Singapore,  where the likelihood  of mentioning inflation as a top problem is similar to
those of Russia and Ukraine, even though inflation was only 2 percent, which tied with
Japan and the Netherlands for lowest inflation in the entire sample!  Since Singapore's
population is largely of Chinese descent, we speculate  that there is a Chinese dummy
variable. This Chinese variable may have something  to do with the memory of the
hyperinflation in China after World War II.  (The Taiwan and Hong Kong dummies are
also at least weakly consistent with the Chinese dummy hypothesis.) It is interesting  that
another country that had a post WWII (and post WWI) hyperinflation  - Hungary  - also
displays a high tendency to mention inflation as a top problem relative to a modest recent
inflation. Perhaps surprisingly,  the observation for Germany is not far out of line with the
average.
Outliers in the other direction are Brazil and Chile. Brazilians are a little less
likely to mention inflation as a top problem than Americans, despite having had around
1000 percent inflation in Brazil over the previous decade. It could be argued that since
the survey was conducted in early 1995, Brazilians  may have already incorporated20
favorable expectations  about the success of the stabilization  plan (the Plan Real)
introduced in mid-  1994. Brazilians may also have been relatively well-protected  from
inflation by indexation  - but the election results in Brazil following the success of the
Plan Real led us to expect high Brazilian inflation aversion. Chile is a similar outlier,
with low concern about inflation despite a history of high inflation  - this could suggest
that the Chilean inflation stabilization  had great credibility by 1995,  and could also reflect
the extensive capital market inflation indexation  in Chile.
More germane to our main question,  we also relate actual country inflation  to
another poverty-related question asked on the Roper-Starch  survey. This question asked
Do you strongly  agree,  mostly  agree,  mostly  disagree,  or strongly  disagree  with  the
following  statement:  "In our society,  the rich  get  richer  and the  poor get poorer"?
In figure 2, we graph the percentage of respondents in each country who answer this
question "strongly agree" against the actual rate of inflation 1985-94. We see a positive
association (which is highly statistically  significant).  Thus, not only do the poor within
each society complain more about inflation,  but the whole society has a perception of a
growing gap between rich and poor in high inflation societies. 4
The evidence from the poll data provides very strong support for the view that the
poor express relatively more dislike of inflation than the rich, and that the less educated
are more inflation averse than the more educated. This provides some support for the
view that inflation hurts the poor relatively more than the rich. Another interpretation
would be that, whatever the facts about the damage inflation does and to whom, the poor
believe it to be more damaging than do the rich. This would suggest that populist21
Figure 2: Association between perception that  "rich get richer and poor
get poorer" and actual inflation
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politicians are likely to pursue more anti-inflationary  policies than those seeking to
appeal to the middle- and upper classes, which is not in accord with our ex ante beliefs.
Perhaps populists depend on a core group of poor supporters  who receive benefits
financed by inflation, even though the poor as a whole may dislike inflation.
III. Results using direct measures  of inequality, poverty, and real wages
In this section we turn to more direct evidence on the effects of inflation on the
distribution of income. We use a number of different measures  of the relative well being
of the poor: the share of the bottom quintile in income, the poverty rate, and the real
minimum wage. All of these three indicators are correlated with.  inflation.
IRA  Results on the bottom quintile in income
We look at changes from one decade average to the next in the share of the
bottom quintile of income, using the data of Deininger and Squire (1996) for the 70s, 80s,
and 90s. We regress the change in the share of the bottom quintile on decade average
CPI inflation and real GDP per capita growth (both from the World Bank database). We
use the inflation tax rate transformation [n/(I -X)] of the percent inflation rate 7t.  This
transformation reduces the extent to which extreme  values of inflation will dominate the
results; it is also the tax rate on money  balances in discrete time, or the annual rate of loss
in the value of money caused by inflation  over the period being considered.  However, the
results shown here are robust to simply using the decade average percent inflation, or the
log change in the CPI. Growth turns out not to be a statistically  significant determinant of
changes in the distribution of income, as other authors have found (e.g. Ravallion and
Chen 1997), so we show only the results with the inflation  tax:23
Dependent Variable: DINCQ  1 (change in the share of the bottom
quintile of the income distribution)
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 110
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard  Errors & Covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  0.004195  0.001545  2.714256  0.0077
INFLATIONTAX  -0.017412  0.005195  -3.351531  0.0011
R-squared  0.028909  Mean dependent var  0.002084
Adjusted R-squared  0.019918  S.D. dependent var  0.013564
The R-squared is very modest, so we are not explaining  much of the variation in
changes in bottom quintile shares. However,  the coefficient on the inflation tax rate is
highly significant. We also try controlling  for growth but it is not significant and does
not change the significance of the inflation tax. A movement  from zero inflation  to
hyperinflation  would decrease the share of the bottom quintile by 1.7 percentage points
(from the coefficient on the inflation  tax). This is economically  significant since the
sample average share of the poor in income is just 6.2 percent.
Given the transformation  of the inflation  rate, the effect of changes in inflation is
nonlinear: a change in the inflation  rate from zero to, say, 40 percent, would reduce the
share of the bottom quintile by 0.5 percent, which again is large relative to the typically
small share of the bottom quintile in the income distribution. With a positive constant,
implying that ceteris  paribus the share of the bottom income quintile in this sample
would have increased over time, we have the share of the bottom quintile increasing if the
inflation tax is less than .24 (corresponding  to an inflation  rate of 31 percent) and
decreasing otherwise.24
There may be an argument for using the change in the inflation  tax rate on the
right hand side of this equation instead of the level. We do not have clear priors on this:
the level of the inflation tax is what is important if some nominal incomes of the poor are
fixed. On the other hand, only "surprise" inflation may effectively  tax the poor, so we
would then want the change in inflation (as opposed to surprises in the price level, in
which our original specification is appropriate). When we rerun the equation above with
the change in the inflation tax, it is not statistically significant. Alternatively,  we can run
the equation in levels: the share of the bottom quintile regressed on the inflation rate (and
the growth rate). The inflation tax rate is then a significant deterninant of the share of the
bottom quintile; an increase of the inflation  tax from zero to hyperinflation  would then
lower the share of the bottom quintile by 1.7 percentage  points.
After getting this result in an earlier version of this paper, we became aware of
related results by Romer and Romer (1998). They show that the log of average income of
the poorest fifth of the population is negatively related to log inflation across countries,
and the Gini coefficient is positively related to log inflation.
III.B Inflation and the  poverty rate
We use data on poverty rates that span more than one point in time for 42
developing and transition countries over 1981-93,  from household data collected by
Ravallion and Chen (1997). For each country,  they construct a country-specific  poverty
line linked to mean income: it is 50 percent of the initial mean income for the household
survey for that country, starting with the initial year of the years included in the sample
for that country. Ravallion and Chen present 64 episodes of changes in poverty rates
using this country-specific  poverty line. The median length of an episode is three years.25
We regress the percentage change per year in the proportion  below the poverty line (50
percent of initial mean income) on real GDP, per capita growth, and the inflation tax rate,
over the period spanned by the change in poverty rate.
Dependent Variable: POVERTYCH  (change in percent of households
below the country-specific  constructed poverty-line)
Method: Least Squares
Included observations: 64
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  7.171827  9.541762  0.751625  0.4552
GROWTH  -5.328780  1.439615  -3.701533  0.0005
INFTAX  62.54719  30.81613  2.029690  0.0468
R-squared  0.496244  Mean dependent var  35.79547
Adjusted  R-squared  0.479727  S.D. dependent var  69.48502
The inflation tax rate has a significant  positive effect on the increase in poverty.
The growth rate has a negative effect on the change in poverty, as Ravallion and Chen
also found. The result on the inflation  tax rate is not robust to using the percent inflation
rate or the log inflation rate (they have the same sign, and log inflation is significant at
the 10 percent level), but the inflation tax rate does have appeal as the most appropriate
functional form. 5
Once again, we are uncertain about whether the level of the inflation tax rate or its
change is more appropriate, for the same reasons mentioned  before. In any case, the
change in the inflation tax rate is insignificant in the poverty change regression, although
it becomes significant of the same sign as in levels when an extreme outlier (Poland
1989-93) is omitted. 626
III.  C Inflation and the real minimum wage
The real minimum wage is not as clear an indicator of the well-being of the poor
as the two previous measures. A decrease in the real minimum wage could benefit the
poor by facilitating  their entry into formal sector employment,  and too high a minimum
wage could make the poor worse off by increasing formal sector  unemployment.
Nonetheless, assuming the minimum wage regulations are observed, the real minimum
wage is a welfare indicator for the group of workers that are at the bottom of the formal
sector wage distribution.
How might inflation affect the real minimum  wage? The government  usually sets
the nominal minimum wage. If there is downward nominal rigidity, the government  will
find it easier to lower the real minimum  wage during times of high inflation. There is
also the arithmetic relationship  pointed out by Bacha and Lopes (1983), among others,
that given an initial real minimum wage, the average real minimum wage is lower the
higher is inflation for a given indexation  lag (e.g. one month) from prices to wages.
We use minimum wage data collected by Rama and Artecona (1999), using a
pooled sample of annual data for all years in which it is available for all countries. We
use the same CPI series as before. We regress the log change in the real minimum wage
on the inflation tax and on real growth per capita. High growth per capita implies rising
labor productivity and so would be expected  to translate into higher average real wages; if
the real minimum wage is sensitive to the average real wage, we would expect it to
increase also. The results are as follows:27
Dependent Variable: Log percent change in real wage
Method: Least Squares
Included observations:  331
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.
C  0.041116  0.016368  2.511911  0.0125
Inflation Tax Rate  -0.004066  0.001900  -2.140478  0.0331
GROWTH  0.004589  0.001547  2.966504  0.0032
R-squared  0.127369 Mean dependent var  -0.000940
Adjusted R-squared  0.122048 S.D. dependent var  0.198479
A high inflation tax rate is significantly  associated with a negative percent change
in the real wage. The real minimum wage change is positively associated with growth, as
expected, with 1 percentage point more growth increasing real minimum wages by 0.4
percent. The explanatory  power of the regression is again modest. The implied effect of
inflation on the minimum real wage is fairly strong: an increase in the inflation tax rate
from zero to, say, 20 percent would reduce the real wage by 8 percentage points. This
strong result depends in part on a large outlier - Nicaragua in 1987 when inflation was
near 1000 percent but the nominal minimum wage only increased by 22 percent. When
this outlier is omitted, the relationship  between the real minimum wage change and the
inflation tax is still significant,  although the magnitude of the coefficient is cut in half.
We also ran the change in real minimum wage equation on the change in the
inflation tax and the growth rate. The change in the inflation  tax is highly significant.
Thus, both the level of the inflation  rate (as would be predicted by Bacha and Lopes28
1983)) and its change (as would be predicted by models in which only surprise inflation
matters) are significantly  associated with the real minimum wage.
IV. Conclusions.
This paper presents evidence  that supports  the view that inflation makes the poor
worse off. The primary evidence comes from the answers  to an international poll of
31,869 respondents in 38 countries. These show that the disadvantaged  on a number of
dimensions  - the poor, the uneducated,  the unskilled (blue collar) worker-  are
relatively more likely to mention inflation as a top concern than the advantaged on these
dimensions. Each dimension is significant  when controlling  for the others, suggesting
that the different components  of being disadvantaged  have independent  effects on
attitudes to inflation.
We also examine the impact of changes  in inflation on direct measures of poverty
and relate them to inflation. We found that high inflation  tended to lower the share of the
bottom quintile and the real minimum wage, while tending to increase poverty. Similar
results on the direct effects of inflation on the per capita incomes of the poor have been
found recently by Romer and Romer (1998) and Agenor (1998). This paper presents
evidence from surveying the poor themselves that they suffer more from inflation than
the rich.29
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Endnotes
l It is not uncommon in such polls for "inflation and high prices" to be classed together as
one issue.
2  coefficient estimates are not the same as the marginal probabilities,  which vary with
the RHS variables. The marginal  probabilities reported here are at the sample means.
3Muddling  the crime story further, there was only a weak statistical association between
the country dummies in the crime regression and the prevalence of actual crimes.
' This result seems to depend on the transition and developing countries, as can be seen
from inspection of figure 2.
5 This seems to imply that some of the extreme inflation observations  don't fit the
regression line very well. This conjecture is confirmed: Brazil and Peru are notable
outliers to the regression using log inflation as the RHS variable. If Brazil and Peru are
omitted, then there is a significant  effect of log inflation on the change in poverty.
6This  outlier seems anomalous because it shows a large increase in poverty, while two
other observations on Poland covering sub-periods of this period do not show dramatic
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